The power of art by Ness, Yngve
Yngve Naess
THE POWER OF ART
In February this year I took part in a conference fór university teachers 
in the Netherlands. The main issue at this conference was the following: Is it 
important that our students, the future teachers have standards ánd values? If 
so, is it our responsibility .that they learn them? And in that case: how? How 
can art help us?
Art is mimesis, I think, or imitation: something is always displayed, even 
if it may be abstract or a phantasy. The ürge to imitate is inbom in man’s 
natúré írom childhood on, Aristotle writes in his Poetic. This applies to 
language, bút alsó behaviour. When imitating, art must show us things the 
way they are or the way they should be, according to Aristotle. (Aristotle 
1982, p. 85ff.; 1460b-1461a) Does it matter, then, if we show the good and 
beautiful, or the opposite? As the poet Róbert Armstrong corréctly notes: 
“Art may imitate life, bút life imitates television.” A French mótion picture 
that was shown in Mexico City explained in great detail how to rob a 
jewellery store. It had to be withdrawn because it was so instructive that it 
quadrupled the rate of local robberies.
Plató would nőt have allowed that: We should nőt show any examples of 
bad behaviour, nőt in our life, and nőt through art, bút fórce the poets to 
describe the good manners, or else cease to make poetry amongst us, he 
says. We should alsó control the other artists, event the musicians. (Plató 
1982, p. 182f.; 401b-401c) The social responsibility is in the foreground, nőt 
the individual pleasure. This makes him very unpopular in our consumer 
society.
In his opinion, rhythm and melody penetrate the sóul and make so strong 
an impression that if someone is well educated, he will see what is good and 
what is nőt as it should be, he will praise the good and beautiful and haté the 
bad and ugly, in all areas of life. This is the aim of educatipn in music. Plató 
calls it “the lőve of beauty”: fór him the beautiful, the good and the true are 
one. (Plató 1982, p. 183ff.; 401b-403c)
This is the starting point in the history of aesthetics or art philosophy. 
Aesthetics is a broader term than philosophy of art, since it studies natúré as 
well. Fór Hegel beauty made by mán was far more important than the 
beauty of natúré. Besides, beauty in natúré was only a reflex of beauty in art. 
(Hegel 1964, p. 20f.) th e  Alps were nasty und ugly until the romantics
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painted and described them in words and music. And Oscar Wilde claimed 
that the fog in London simply was nőt there until the artists showed it. 
(Wilde 1998, p. 45f.) Iftthis is correctyrart has an immense responsibility: 
dangerous, bút with incredible possibilities.
This is why aesthetic knowledge is sp important, especially in the 
narrower sense, as philosophy of art, Fór the study of art must be a study of 
humanity: it should nőt fócüs őri caúsal explanations like the (nátUral) 
Sciences, bút rather on intentionái explanations. This can teách us soiriething 
about mán, to understand more fuíly the natúré of humán réality, nőt 
considering the history of forms, bút of the minds behind the forms.
Therefore musical understanding is fór me the Central goal of music 
education. An art wórk should be appróached fór insight rather than 
information. This corresponds to the difference between the explaining 
(erklaren) of the natural Sciences and the understanding (verstehen) óf the 
humanities. A work of art telis you something, bút, as Gad,amer uriderlines, 
only if you want to be told. (Grondin 1997, s. 117.) It is our piain duty to 
make our students want to be told something, and then let theiri kriow hów 
this process can take piacé.
Thus music education should use works that are capáblé of bririging this 
insight. And the teaching must bé so árránged that aesthetic' expprience is 
Central. Already Aristotle noted that somé inusic was suitáble fór íeisure, 
whereas other music must be used fór educátion. (Aristotle 1989, p. 386ff.; 
1341b-1342b) Bút I am afraid this is very far away írom our reality today, at 
least in Norway.
In the works of art we find certain affects expresséd. This can give us a 
better insight in different ways of experience, as wéll as increasing the 
ability of feeling ourselves in the piacé of others, and thus be a source of 
understanding each other better. However, it is nőt enough to catalogue and 
describe these affects and the retorical gestures. We need to know why they 
were used in just that way. Behind thé gesture we must seek mán in his 
spiritual context.
This increasing of the ability to pút oneself iri the piacé of others is an 
important effect of art. The word empathy was used especially by the 
romantic aesthetic philosophers and artists.
Rousseau, himself a philosopher, admits that philosophy isolates mán. 
(Rousseau 1979, p. 1-7.) This is the dark side of enlightenment. The poet 
Hölderlin, on the other hand, States his visions and ideals clearly and 
beautifully: ‘T o  be at one with everything, that is the divine life, that is 
man’s heaven. To be one with all that lives, in blessed self-denial to return
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to natúré’s all, that is the peak of all thoughts and pléasures, that is the 
sacred mountain, the piacé of eternal rest, áhd all thoughts disappear against 
the impression of the eternal one world.” (Hölderlin 1995, p. 9.)
The romantics are all longing fór, striving tówards this unity. Their art is 
supposed to help us, too, by showing us, with the words öf AriStotle, things 
the way they should be. The true and genuine rómánticism teaches us to feel 
at one with the world, with natúré, with all mankind, with God. It alsó 
teaches us renunciation: to give oneself up.
As a reaction against rómánticism, however, Brecht introduced 
Verfremdung, aesthetic distance. He wanted to replace the magicái theatre 
with the scientific. Has he succeeded more than hé ever expected? Has 
magic completely left art? '
The ancient cult drama, which was art per se, and included all kinds of 
art, visual, literal, musical and dramatic, was explicitly meant to have 
influence on the world, it was believed to have powers to change, to 
recreate, to clean, to rebuild. This aspect we seem to have lost.
Hegel writes in his lectures o'n aesthetics: Art is fór us “a thing of the 
pást”. It is no longer understood as a presentation of the divine in the way it 
had been in the Greek world, in their temples and in sculpture. Christianity 
had a more profound insight intő the transcendence of God: it could no 
longer be adequately expressed within the visual language of art or the 
poetic language. The work of art was no longer the presence of the divine. 
(Hegel 1964, p. 30f.)
On the contrary: the slogan “Art fór art’s sake” turnéd up. In a small 
poem used as a foreword in the print of two of his dramas in 1852, the 
French poet de Musset wrote: “Imagine having got a ticket to the opera. You 
do nőt know the piece; perháps it will make you cry, or maybe laugh. Bút 
yawn you probably will -  that is the usual thing one does, and time passes 
by. This may alsó be the effect of my book. It costs about as much as a 
ticket. Whether you are dissatisfied or nőt, close it without repentance. 
There are many boring plays, and mine you can see without leaving your 
easy chair.” (Hirsbrunner 1981, s. 178f.) This art is completely 
unpretentious.
Then came modernism: There is no aesthetic value, no beauty. All 
values are abolished, all means are allowed in order to destroy the old ideals. 
The music should let us see our naked, ugly self, full of boils. (Zoltai 1978, 
p. 75.) There should be no pleasant moods, no harmonious connections. 
Several aestheticians from Eastern Europe taught that only art made by 
Marxists is good, because only they had the correct understanding of life
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and the existence. Schopenhauer had claimed that music expresses the jnner 
natúré of the world. (Schopenhauer 1987, bd. I, p. 374.) Many modernists 
would agree, bút of course they think completely different about this inner 
natúré, or they concentrate on describing the exteriőr ugliness.
In postmodemism, on the other hand, the guiding principle is more or 
less the aesthetic feelings of what is new and interesting, fascinating and 
refined, and nőt boring, worn-out or dűli. We are no longer concemed about 
the contents, only the form, the texture, the matériái. The symbol (originally 
a ring or piece of pottery divided in two parts and kept by the owners as a 
confirmation of their unity) is reduced to a sign that can mean anything you 
choose. The work of art -  a picture fór instance -  will nőt teli you anything. 
We should nőt even allow it to try, so says the (post)modem phijosophy. 
One composer even closes his grand piano, to make sure he does npt express 
anything, or he lets the pianist just sit there fór somé, minutes .without 
producing a, single tone. And a spokesman fór the undetermiried, the 
accidental music claims: “There must be coincidence. Ötherwise there 
would be no surprise, and surprise is needed to overcome boredom and 
monotony.” (Ed. Barck, Gente, Paris, Richter 1998, p.311.)
And sp Manffed Geier finds that a new form of indifference Controls the 
post-metaphysical thinking and the post-modern feeling. The absurd, the 
nothingness and the emptiness, have lost their semantic power. In their piacé 
entertainment, recreation and cooíness have entered. The spectator’s only 
fear is that he might miss something. Could it be that the other TV-program 
is better after all? (Geier 1997, p. 217f; 231.)
When art will no longer have influence upon society, it gives up the 
social responsibility.. The painter Kandinsky complains: “The ‘what’ in árt. 
disappears, the question is of no interest, so we are left with the question of 
‘how’. This ‘how’ gets ever more specialized, only the artist himself can 
understand it, and he then complains that the spectators are nőt interested.” 
(Kandinsky 1959, p. 32.) Bút precisely this ‘what’ is it that confronts mán 
with himself, and thereby decides about art’s piacé in the consciousness of 
eyeryone and its relation to society.
In the post-war generation: what did the young people in the Western 
world miss? Nőt food and clothes, bút values. This is a paradox: in the name 
of democracy one would give the young people the chance to make their 
own choices, fmd their own values, nőt inheriting our points of view. Bút 
they wanted conviction, enthusiasm. So many of them turnéd to extreme 
political movements, where they found people who believe in something - 
without shame.
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They wanted, and still want, meaning. With other words: they want 
contents. Why do we like tragedy? Susanne Langer asks, and answers 
herself: It gives the vision of a world wholly significant. Which is to say: 
Art gives meaning to the world. (Cited in Reimer 1970, p. 85.)
This reminds us again of Aristotlei in his Poetic: Art is more 
philosophical than history, because it telis you. what must happen under 
given circumstances. (Aristotle 1982, p. 29; 1451a-1451b) And of Hegel, 
who says: “The work of art shows us the eternal powers that reign in 
history.” (Hegel 1964, p. 29.) We still have much to leam.
Schiller’s appeal is clear and strong: “Live with your century, bút do nőt 
be its product. Give your contemporaries what they need, nőt what they 
praise.” (Schiller n.y., p. 283.) Discussing the stage as a morál institution, he 
writes: “What a strengthening of law and religion if they go in alliance with 
the stage, where there is perception and living simultaneousness. Like 
visible presentation affects us more powerfully ,than dead letters and cold 
stories, just as cértain the .stage has a deeper and more lasting effect than 
morál and laws.” (Schiller n.y., p. 84f.) And Wagner’s words are still valid: 
In its time of blossom the Greek art was conservative, because it 
corresponded to society, bút now it must be radical, because our society is 
so far removed írom the ideals of art, that art ;represents a eontradiction to 
the valid consensus. (Wagner 1976, bd. Ш, p. 28.)
The American composer George Rochberg alsó underlinés art’s: 
responsibility fór bringing hope and strengthening humanity. It must never 
get so scientific and technological that this aspect is lost: ”Forms of art 
without any humán content, and therefore meaning, are based on the values 
of machine technology ... How can we reconcile ourselves to a situatión 
where art is unable to offer any hope, being beautiful to contemplate bút 
having no power to affect reality?” (Rochberg 2004, p. 131, 1 3 9 ,173.)
Schiller explains to us how the artist can bring this hope and therehy- 
affect reality. He sees culture as striving fór- a State of harmony and peace: 
Mán needs a confirmation that it is possible to realize this idea. Experience 
does nőt support this belief, he says, on the cöntrary,.so art’s task is to make 
this idea explicit and realize it in a concrete ekámple. (Schiller n.y., p. 43.1 f.) 
He is right. Fór if we lose this belief, we have lost everything.
We learn through the experience of art that things can be seen and felt in 
different ways. Does this mean that the philosopher Marquard’s request that 
we should have many different convictions, and nőt just one, is the only 
solution? (Marquard 1996, p. 132ff.)
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Nőt necessarily. In Leseiig’ s dráma “Náthán the wise mán” he telis us a 
parable about a special ring which was owned by a king. This ring had the 
power of making its owner' beloved by God and mán, if he trusted in it. 
Every owner was instructed to give it to the són he liked the most, and this 
són should -  regardless of age -  become the new sovereign.
Bút theri it háppened that one king lóvéd all his three sons equally much, 
and could nőt decide to whom he should give the ring. In fact, he had 
promised eách óf them that he should have it. He let an artist make two 
copies of the ring, and so wéll that nobody could discem the reál ring írom 
the copies. Each són got one ring, and ás the father died, each of them 
claimed to be the new king. But it was impossible to teli which ring was the 
reál, true one. Just like, as Náthán puts it, it is impossible to say which faith 
is the true and reál: Of course, these three sons wfere Christian, Jew and 
Moslem.
They went to the judgé, whó said:T“The ritíg makes everyone lőve you? 
Well then, whom do the two of you lőve möst?” That one would be in 
possession of the reál ring, fór this was supposed tö be its effect: to make its 
owner beloved by everyone. As there is rio answer, he exclaims: “What? 
Everyone lövés only himself? Then maybe all Hngs: are false, and the reál 
ring has been lost? Now each of you shóuld try tö déhiohstrate that his ring 
is the reál one, by showing us that the pówer liés irt hisTing, and máy 
meekness, tolerance, friendliness, chatíty, devotidft to Godhélp you. In 
thousand years yoü shaíl come back, to a wiser judge than me. Then we 
shall get the answef'” (Lessing 1990, p. 71ff.) ''
This aspect is vaüd nőt only fór religion, bút fór art as well. There, too, 
we find different ways of thiriking and féeling, different schools and trends, 
eras and creeds. We should let them all speak to us, express their feelings 
and their beliefs to us, and try to listen with empathy ánd sensitivity. Art has 
no clear, unambiguous answer to the questions and probléms óf the world. 
Neither has mán. So we shall nőt risk being one-sided.
In this way, then, art might nőt any longer be a “thing of the pást”, nof 'a 
more omamentation of out otherwise rather boring everyday life, b ú t 
something that gathers us, challenges us, and telis us, with the famous words 
of the poet Rilke: you have to change your life. (Rilke 1975, bd. II p. 557.)
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